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1 Introduction: The Dominant View on What Is Said, Semantic
Content, and Lexical Meaning
Suppose that on Friday March 31, 2006, Inma comes into the room, and, pointing at
her, I say:
(1) She has graduated in math.
There is a widely accepted view that concerns, all at once, (i) the semantic value of
the pronoun 'she' in (1); (ii) the semantic content associated with, or the proposition
expressed by, the sentence uttered in (1) relative to that context of utterance; and (iii)
the content that I have asserted by uttering (1), or the "what is said". This dominant
view, whose  origin we find in Kripke's theory of rigid designation and in Kaplan's
theory of direct reference, tells us that: (i) the semantic value of 'she' in (1) is Inma
herself; (ii) the semantic content of the sentence in (1), with respect to the context of
(1), is the proposition that at some time prior to March 31, 2006 Inma graduated in
math; and (iii) that same proposition is also the content asserted, or what is said.  
While the dominant view identifies the notion of semantic content with the notion
of what is said, it is eager to distinguish the two notions from two related notions: the
notion of what is conveyed, on the one hand, and the notion of lexical meaning, on
the other. 
Consider  (1)  again,  as  suppose  that  I  utter  it  while  discussing a  mathematical
problem that you and I were unable to solve. Then the reason why I told you (1) was
not necessarily to inform you that Inma has graduated in math. In fact, let's suppose
that you knew that already. Then my intention in (1) must have been to inform you of
something else, like the following:
(2) Inma should be able to help us solve the problem.
My utterance of (1) clearly does not say the same thing as (2), but in the context at
stake, (1)  conveys  what (2) says. The distinction between what is said and what is
conveyed is, of course, due to Paul Grice, and has been very much discussed in the
literature. I will have little to say about it here. 
More importantly for our purposes, the dominant view draws a distinction between
semantic content and lexical meaning (also called linguistic meaning, or 'character' in
Kaplan's technical terminology). All that the lexical meaning of the sentence in (1)
tells  you is that prior  to some contextually salient time, some contextually salient
female individual  graduated  in  math.  Mere  lexical  knowledge of  what the  words
uttered mean does not enable you to figure out who the woman and what the time at
stake are, hence it does not determine what is said. However, the move from lexical
meaning to what is said is supposed to be fairly direct, requiring only knowledge of
some basic parameters of the context of utterance: who is speaking, to whom, where
and when, and to what they are referring. In the dominant view, what is said is, then,
something that can be obtained more or less directly from the lexical meaning of the
words uttered, the syntax of the sentence, and those basic contextual parameters. By
contrast, what is conveyed heavily depends on the context, and requires reasoning
about speaker's beliefs and intentions, inference to the best explanation, and a fair
amount of encyclopedic knowledge. 
My goal in this paper is twofold. First, I will present a series of cases that put into
jeopardy the dominant view. What those cases show is that  both our  practices of
reporting what is said and our intuitions on what is said do not fit into the Kaplanian
model, according to which what is said by an utterance of a sentence containing a
personal pronoun is the proposition containing the person referred to with the help of
the pronoun. Second, I will suggest that those cases fit better into a simpler, single-
level model, according to which the notions of semantic content and what is said are
still interchangeable, but are both reduced to, or identified with, the notion of lexical
meaning. On that model, what is said in (1) is merely that prior to some contextually
salient time, some female individual graduated in math. The semantic value of the
pronoun 'she' in (1) will not be Inma herself, but rather the general condition of being
female, lexically encoded in the meaning of the pronoun 'she'. Granted, there is the
intuition that when I utter (1) pointing at Inma, I say something  about  Inma. This
intuition will be preserved, though, through an independently motivated notion of the
subject matter of a conversation (or of an utterance). The idea is, roughly, that when I
utter (1), I am talking about Inma, and I am referring to Inma, but Inma is not part of
what I  said – rather, what I  said is the lexical meaning of the sentence, and I am
asserting that meaning of, or about,  Inma. After laying down the main tenets of my
view, I will reconsider, one by one, the cases that I will have previously shown to be
problematic for the dominant view.
2 What Is Said: the Data
At a first glance, one might plausibly suppose that the linguistic meaning associated
with a sentence is the most obvious candidate to play the role of what is said by an
utterance of that sentence. In the second part of my paper, I am going to argue that
this is indeed a very plausible view. However, as already noted, this view is widely
rejected nowadays. It will help, then, to start with those cases that have motivated its
rejection, discussed in 2.1. and 2.2. Then, from 2.3. to 2.6., I will discuss new cases,
which I hope will motivate the rejection of the dominant view. For simplicity, I am
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only considering a small fragment of English, including pronouns, some simple verb
phrases, and proper names; although any problems related to proper names (like the
Hesperus/Phosphorus puzzle) are going to be entirely ignored. 
2.1 Different Meanings, Same Things Said
The first motivation for a distinguished level of what is said comes from utterances
whose speakers intuitively say the same thing, even though the sentences that they use
do not have the same lexical meaning. Suppose that I say:
(3) I have graduated in philosophy.
By uttering (3), I may inform you that I have graduated in philosophy. Now, suppose
that you want to inform someone else of this. You cannot use the same sentence that I
used, because then you would inform your interlocutor that you, not I, have graduated
in philosophy. I can sure refer to myself using the first person pronoun, but you need
to find another way of referring to me. For instance, you might say:
(4) Isidora has graduated in philosophy.
Or, if I am there and you are pointing at me, you might just say:
(5) She has graduated in philosophy.
The sentences uttered in (3), (4) and (5) have different meanings, given that different
linguistic conventions are associated with 'I', 'she' and proper names. The 1st person
pronoun is used for the speaker, the 3rd person pronoun, for some salient female, and
the name, for a bearer of that name. Still, for Kaplan and his followers, what you say
in (4) or (5) and what I say in (3) is one and the same thing – something like the
proposition true in those and only those worlds in which I, Isidora, have graduated in
philosophy before the time of my utterance.1
2.2 Same Meanings, Different Things Said
The second motivation for the dominant view is the idea that you can use one and the
same non-ambiguous sentence to express different things, provided that you use it in
different contexts. As David Kaplan puts it: “What is said in using a given indexical
in different contexts may be different. Thus if I say, today, “I was insulted yesterday,”
and you utter  the  same words tomorrow, what is  said is  different  […] There  are
1 This intuition goes back at least to Frege, who wrote: “It is not necessary that the person who
feels cold should himself give utterance to the thought that he feels cold. Another person can
do this by using a name to designate the one who feels cold” (236)  
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possible circumstances in which what I said would be true but what you said would
be false. Thus we say different things” (1989: 500).2 
Ever since Kaplan, it has been widely held that once we have indexicals in the
language, lexical meaning differs from semantic content, and thereby from what is
said, in two respects: (1) there is something in what is said that is not in the lexical
meaning, namely, the reference of indexicals; (2)  there is something in the lexical
meaning that does not reach into what is said, namely, the general, lexically encoded
conditions that are there merely to help us fix the reference, such as being the speaker
for the indexical 'I', or being female for the pronoun 'she'.
2.3 Time in What Is Said
It is widely held that in simple sentences, the present tense works like a referential
expression (cf. Partee (73)). It picks out a time, presumably the time of the utterance,
and brings it into the semantic content and into what is said by the utterance. The
problem is that if what is said is thus tied to a specific time, there will be many cases
in which people have the intuition that the same thing has been said, and will easily
report what has been said as being the same, even though the propositions expressed
by the reported utterances do not coincide on the time picked out by the present
tense. To see the point, it is enough to go back to one of our previous examples:
(6) She has graduated in math. (me, talking of Inma, on Friday, March 31, 2006)
(7)  Inma has graduated in math. (Tarek, talking of Inma, on Tuesday, April 3, 2006).
(8)  That's what Isidora said, too. (a possible reply to Tarek's utterance of (7))
The reply in (8) is intuitively correct.3 It is natural to take Tarek to have said, in (7),
the same thing as I did in (6), even though we spoke on different days, and therefore
our utterances have different Kaplanian contents, namely, that Inma has graduated
prior to March 31, 2006, the time of my utterance, vs. that she has graduated prior to
April 3, 2006, the time of Tarek's utterance. 
Note that not only the contents, but the lexical meanings of the sentences uttered
are different, too. The meaning of the proper name, to the extent to which proper
names have lexical meanings at all, tells you to pick out a bearer of that name, while
the 3rd person pronoun 'she' tells you to pick out a contextually salient female. 
 Some might think that the reason why we can so easily report me as having said
the same thing as Tarek is this. It is a fact that if some event e has happened prior to
2 This insight, too, goes back to Frege: “The sentence ‘I am cold’ expresses a different thought
in the mouth of one person from what it expresses in the mouth of another.” (ibid.)
3 A methodological remark is in order. The intuitions that I am reporting have been gathered
from several  native English speakers, as well as several  native French speakers for similar
examples in French, and several native Serbian speakers (including myself) for examples in
Serbian. Of course, nothing guarantees that a larger, more serious, experimental study of the
intuitive judgments of truth and falsity of such speech-reports would give us the same data, but
there is every reason to think that it should. 
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time t1, and if t1 is before t2, then event e has happened prior to time t2. It follows that
the truth of my utterance entails the truth of Tarek's utterance. Now, whether or not
this is the correct explanation of the intuitive same-saying in (6)-(7), where  the tense
of the sentence is present perfect, it is easy to devise sentences in present progressive
that exhibit the same pattern. Consider:
(9) Inma is writing a paper on Montague. (said by Tarek, on March 31, 06)
(10) I am writing a paper on Montague. (said by Inma, on April 3, 06)
(11) That's what Tarek told me. (a possible reply to Inma's utterance of (11))
Again, the reply in (11), as a report of what Tarek said in (9), is correct, though no
explanation in terms of the truth of (9) entailing the truth of (10) seems available. To
be sure, there may be other explanations available to the defenders of the dominant
view. For instance, one could point out that writing a paper is an action that normally
takes several days, even months, so that the time interval picked out by the present
progressive in (9) will sufficiently overlap with the time interval picked out by the
tense in  (10),  so  that  even if  the  propositions  expressed by (9)  and (10)  are not
exactly the same, they will be similar enough to be reported as same.4 
If we vary the example, we seem to get evidence that supports this explanation.
For, suppose that Inma utters (10) at a time very distant from the time at which Tarek
utters (9): suppose she says it 5 years from now (i.e. in 2011). Then it does not seem
correct  to  reply (11)  on  the  grounds of  Tarek's  utterance  (9).  Or,  at  least,  some
qualification would be needed, such as "That's what Tarek told me five years ago." 
To get to the same point, consider what happens in reports of what is said when the
reported action concerns a short period of time:
(12)Inma is having dinner. (said by Tarek, on March 31, at 7 pm)
(13) I am having dinner. (said by Inma, on March 31, at 11 pm)
(14) That's what Tarek told me. (a possible reply to Inma's utterance of (11))
On the one hand, (9)-(10) and (12)-(13) are of the same pattern, but on the other,
the report in (11) is much more easily seen as correct than is the report in (14). What
to conclude from this? I must ask the reader to wait until section  3.3., where I will
give  my own analysis  of  the  problem.  Meanwhile,  let  me  explain  why this  is  a
problem for  the dominant view. The view holds that  the proposition expressed is
what is said by a given utterance.  But (6)  and (7) express different  propositions,
because different times are picked out by the tense. And, however largely overlapping
time intervals we take to be picked out by the present progressive in (9) and (10),
those, too, end up expressing different propositions. The view is therefore committed
to  holding that what is said in (6)  and (7) is different, and that (9) and (10) say
different things, too. This, however, is unsatisfactory, because both our intuitions and
4 Suggestions along similar lines have been made to me, independently, by Ricardo Santos and
Nathan Salmon.
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our practice of reporting what is said show that there is an important sense in which
(6) and (7) say the same thing, and so do (9) and (10). 
At this point, two manoeuvres are available to the defenders of the dominant view.
One is to abandon the idea that semantic contents are  eternal  propositions, that is,
propositions whose truth only depends on what the  world  is like, and to take them
instead to be temporal propositions, that is, propositions whose truth may vary also
with times.5 
I have no objections to temporal propositions per se (in fact, we shall see that in
my own account, semantic contents receive their truth value as a function of time,
too, among other things). What I want to note here is that conceiving of what is said
as  something  that  may  be  true  at  some  times  and  false  at  others  is  already  a
remarkable departure from the dominant view. Recall the well-known passage from
Frege: “But are there not thoughts which are true today but false in six months’ time?
The thought, for example, that the tree there is covered with green leaves, will surely
be false in six months’ time. No, for it is not the same thought at all. The words ‘This
tree is covered with green leaves’ are not sufficient by themselves to constitute the
expression of  thought,  for  the  time of  utterance  is  involved  as  well.”(343)6 Even
Kaplan, who, in his formal system, uses contents that are functions of world-time
pairs, gives us every reason to think that the contents expressed by natural language
sentences are, in his view, time-specific. 
More importantly, a switch to temporal propositions may be fine enough to deal
with the problematic cases that concern the contribution of tense to what is said, but
the  manoeuvre cannot be easily generalized to other problematic cases, as we will
soon be able to see.    
The second manoeuvre that may help you salvage the dominant view is to bite the
bullet and insist that because (6) and (7) express different propositions, what is said
in them is different, and therefore, the report in (8) is literally false, while those who
have the intuition that (6) and (7) say the same thing are simply in mistake. As this
manoeuvre, unlike the previous one, may be easily replicated in many of the cases
that  are  yet to  come,  I  must  ask the  reader  to  wait  until  section  3.1.,  where this
“literalist” manoeuvre will be shown to be unsatisfactory. 
2.4 De Se Assertion (1): Same Meanings, Same Things Said
For our next challenge to the dominant view, we can actually use, and turn against it,
a case that had earlier served precisely to motivate it. Suppose that Prof. Feferman
says:
(15) I am writing a book on Montague.
Next, suppose that, possibly at a different time, Inma says:
5 Temporal propositions originate in A. Prior's pioneering work on tense logic: Prior (1957).
6 One of the most elaborate and most influential attacks against temporal propositions may be
found in Evans (1979). 
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(16) I am writing a book on Montague.
Pace  Frege's claim that Inma and Prof. Feferman will express different  thoughts,
and Kaplan's echoing claim that different people using the 1st person pronoun  say
different things,  there is an equally strong intuition that, in some important sense,
what Feferman said in (15) is exactly what Inma said in (16). Each said that he or she
was writing a book on Montague. Thus, having heard Prof. Feferman in (16), I may
comment as follows on Inma's utterance of (16):
(17) That's what Professor Feferman said, too.
To be sure, as it stands, (17) is ambiguous between reporting Feferman as having
said  that  Inma  was writing  a  book  on  Montague,  vs.  that  he  himself  was.  This
ambiguity, in linguists' jargon, is the  ambiguity between  strict vs.  sloppy  readings.7
Thus, suppose that Prof. Feferman has never heard of Inma, and that this is common
knowledge in the context of my utterance of (17). Then the dominant reading is the
sloppy reading, on which what Feferman said is that he, not Inma, was writing a book
on Montague. The problem, of course, for the dominant view is that the semantic
contents of (15) and (16) are different, one involving Feferman and the other Inma,
hence  either  what  is  said  is  not  semantic  content,  or  else,  one  must  insist  that,
notwithstanding intuitions, what is said is different.
The move that consists in saying that, after all, what is said is not semantic content
amounts to rejecting the dominant view on what is said (even if, admittedly, it does
not reject the dominant, Kaplanian view on semantic content). I will come back to
this move in 3.1. 
Three other moves are still available to the defenders of the dominant view. First,
one might redefine propositions that constitute semantic contents. In the same way in
which temporal propositions were used to deal with those cases in which the time
relevant to the truth value of the utterance appeared not to be part of what is said,
what we might call egocentric propositions can help us deal with those cases in which
the person relevant to the truth value of the utterance does not appear to be part of
what is said.8 Egocentric propositions are propositions that may take different truth
values relative to different individuals; in other words, they are properties. 
The suggestion that what is said is, at least sometimes, an egocentric proposition
may be found, for instance, in a not well-known article by R. Feldman: "We can say
that what I assert by uttering 'I was insulted yesterday' is something that can be true
for, or relative to, one person at one time, while being false relative to some other
person at the same or some other time. So you and I assert the same thing by uttering
'I was insulted yesterday' and this thing may be true for me when I assert it and false
for you when you assert it." (1980: 79) What lends further plausibility to the idea that
the content of an assertion is an egocentric proposition, or a property, is that the idea
squares very well with the view according to which contents of beliefs and other
7 E.g. Lasnik (1989), Lappin (1997), Buring (2003). The sloppy/strict distinction is primarily
discussed in the linguistic literature on ellipsis and anaphora.
8 Unsurprisingly, egocentric propositions were also pioneered by Prior: Prior (1977). 
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"propositional" attitudes are, in fact, properties. This was the view that David Lewis
put forward in order to deal with the problem of  de se  attitudes.9 What sometimes
goes unnoticed  in  Lewis'  account  of  de se  attitudes  is  that  there  are  two crucial
components to his view. One is that the content of the attitude is a property (rather
than an old-fashioned proposition). The other is that to believe such a content is to
self-ascribe it, that is, to believe that the property applies to oneself. This will turn out
to be relevant later on, as we shall see that not only in de se attitudes, but also in de
se assertion, this mechanism of self-ascription  plays a crucial role. In (15), it is not
just that Feferman (the speaker) is asserting a certain property, viz. the property of
writing a book on Montague. He is asserting this property of himself. 
Now, whether or not egocentric propositions are the right way to handle  de se
assertion and account for the intuition that Feferman in (15) and Inma in (16) are
saying the same thing, what needs to be emphasized is that such a manoeuvre really
amounts to giving up the dominant view. The indexical 'I' has been, for Kaplan and
his followers, a paradigmatically directly referential expression; that is, an expression
that contributes its reference, and nothing but its reference, to the semantic content
and to what is said. To say that in (15), Feferman, who is the speaker and hence the
reference of the word 'I', is not part of the semantic content, is to give up one of the
main tenets of the received wisdom on indexicality and direct reference.
The second manoeuvre to deal with de se assertion, which has become something
of a standard response made by those who want to account for the sense in which (15)
and (16) say the same thing without stepping out of the mainstream tradition, is to
point  out  that  the  sentences  used  by Feferman and  Inma are  the  same,  and  then
suggest that when two people use the same sentence or utter the same words, they
may be truly reported as having said the same thing. In the next two sections (2.5. and
2.6.) I will show that this manoeuvre is unsatisfactory for two reasons. First, it fails to
generalize. For, an equally strong intuition of same-saying may be triggered, in de se
assertion,  even  when  the  sentences  used  are  neither  the  same  nor  synonymous.
Second, it over-generates. For, there are cases that minimally differ from (15)-(16) in
which speakers will use the same words, yet one cannot truly report them as having
said the same thing (except by adding special qualifications).
Finally, the third,  “literalist” manoeuvre consists again in insisting that the report
in (17) is, strictly speaking, false, and that the intuition of same-saying is mistaken.
As before, I shall postpone the discussion of this manoeuvre until section  3.1.
2.5 De Se Assertion (2): Different Meanings, Same Things Said
We have seen that when different people say "I am writing a book," there is a sense in
which they are saying the same thing, for each is saying that he or she is writing a
book. The usual way of dealing with such cases is to point out that those people are
all using the same sentence, which would then explain why we are inclined to hear
them as saying the same thing – for, after all, they are uttering the same words.
9 See Lewis (1981). To my knowledge, Lewis did not argue that contents of assertions are also
properties. Nor did argue that there were not. He just did not pronounce himself on the issue.  
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In this and in the next section, I want to show that this is not the right response to
the problem of what is said in de se assertion. Although using the same sentence may
partly account for the intuition that the same thing has been said, that cannot be the
end of the story. For, even when the propositions expressed by the two utterances are
different, it is neither necessary nor sufficient to use the same sentence in order to be
intuitively saying the same thing, or for the report that the same thing has been said to
come out intuitively true. 
Suppose that during Feferman's class on Montague, Inma tells Tarek:
(18) I really like this class. 
The following week, Tarek and Mitsuko are talking about the classes that they like or
dislike, and Mitsuko says:
(19) I really like Feferman's class on Montague.
Tarek may correctly reply to Mitsuko:
(20) Inma said that, too.
The sentences used by Inma and Mitsuko are obviously different, and so are their
lexical  meanings.  Furthermore,  suppose  that  Tarek  and  Mitsuko's conversation  is
taking place during Prof. Lawlor's metaphysics class. Then if Mitsuko were to use the
same sentence that Inma used, she would have ended up saying that she really liked
Lawlor's metaphysics class, and Tarek's reply that this was also what Inma said would
then be false. For, the report in (20) is true to the extent that both Inma and Mitsuko
were talking of one and the same class – Feferman's class on Montague – that they
said they really liked. 
The problem, to sum up, is that the propositional contents that Kaplanian theories
assign to (18) and (19) are different, the first being that Inma really likes that class,
and the second, that Mitsuko really likes it. But the lexical meanings, or Kaplanian
characters, associated with those sentences are also different, hence the truthfulness
of Tarek's report in (20) cannot be attributed to Inma and Mitsuko's having uttered
the same sentence, since they have not.
2.6 Same Meanings, Different Things Said. De Te and De Re Assertion. 
Just as using the same sentence is not required for the same thing to be said, it is not
enough either. Consider the following (minimal) pair of situations:
(i) de se assertion
(21) I am too old for graduate school. (Inma talking to Tarek)
(22) I am too old for graduate school. (Mitsuko talking to Tarek)
(23) That's what Inma said, too. (Tarek's reply to Mitsuko)
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(ii) de te assertion 
(24) You are too old for graduate school. (Prof. Feferman talking to Inma, 
  overheard by Tarek)
(25) You are too old for graduate school. (Tarek talking to Mitsuko)
(26) (?) That's what Prof. Feferman said, too. (still Tarek talking to Mitsuko)
There is a striking asymmetry between the 1st person and the 2nd person pronoun in
how they behave in speech reports. Consider (23). As it stands, it has two readings:
one on which Inma is reported as having said that  Mitsuko  is too old for graduate
school (the strict reading), and one on which she is reported as having said that she
herself  is  too old for  graduate school  (the  sloppy  reading).  If  it  is,  say,  common
knowledge in the context of (23) that Inma would have never said such a thing about
Mitsuko (say, because she has no idea who Mitsuko is, or because such a comment
would have been politically incorrect and Inma would never say such things), then
the dominant reading of (23) is its sloppy reading, and (23) comes out true in virtue
of Inma's having uttered (21). However, if we try the same sort of sloppy report by
simply replacing 'I' by 'you', no such report seems to be available. For, there is a very
strong intuition that (26) is not ambiguous, but downright false (assuming that Prof.
Feferman never said that Mitsuko was too old for graduate school). 
This asymmetry between  de se  and what one might call  "de te"  cases raises the
following problem. Suppose, as does the dominant view, that propositional contents
play the role of what is said. But (21) and (22) have different contents, and still, in an
important sense, they say the same thing. For, in both cases, the speaker is saying of
herself that she is too old for graduate school. Furthermore, the report in (23), when
properly disambiguated, is uncontroversially true. Now, one might think that this is
because the sentences uttered in (21) and (22) are the same. But take (24) and (25).
Here, too, the sentences uttered are the same, but we do not get a sloppy reading for
the report (26). That report is not ambiguous, but false. This shows that something
was missing in the account that the dominant view gave us for the de se cases in the
first place.
But one might object that, after all, there is a sense in which speakers making de te
assertions and asserting the same thing, not of themselves, but of the person they are
talking to, are saying the same thing. For, aren't both Feferman in (24) and Tarek in
(25) saying that their addressee was too old for graduate school?
Indeed, there is this sense of same-saying for de te assertions as well. And, what's
more, it is possible to truly report Feferman in (24) as saying the same thing as Tarek
in (25), but under certain conditions. Namely, the reporter must explicitly mention the
relevant addressee: 
(27) That's what Prof. Feferman said, too, to Inma. (Tarek talking to Mitsuko)
Unlike (26), which our intuitions tell us is not ambiguous but false, the report in (27)
has two readings: one on which Feferman said to Inma that Mitsuko was too old for
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graduate school (the strict reading), and one on which he told her that she was too old
for it (the sloppy reading). Similarly, consider:
(28) Prof. Feferman told Inma that she was too old for graduate school.
(29) That's what Tarek told Mitsuko, too.
If I tell you (28) and you reply with (29), your reply is ambiguous between reporting
Tarek as telling Mitsuko that she was too old for graduate school, and his telling her
that Inma was too old for it. Moreover, there is even a third reading, on which what
Tarek told Mitsuko is  that Feferman told Inma that she was too old for  graduate
school. But if we put momentarily this third reading aside, what needs to be noted is
that the strict/sloppy ambiguity exists for reports of de te assertions as well, provided
that  the  person  to  whom the  reportee  was  talking  is  explicitly  mentioned  in  the
report.10
The difference between the 1st person pronoun and the 3rd person pronoun in how
they behave in reported speech is even more striking. Consider the following minimal
pair with respect to (i) and (ii):
(iii) de re assertion
(30) She is too old for graduate school. (Prof. Feferman, talking of Inma)
(31) She is too old for graduate school. (Tarek, talking of Mitsuko)
(32) (?) That's what Professor Feferman said, too. (in reply to Tarek)
Again, (32) does not appear to be ambiguous. There is a unique, determinate way to
understand  the  report,  namely,  that  Feferman said  that  Mitsuko was too  old  for
graduate school. 
To be sure, one might object that even with the 3rd person pronoun, there is a sense
of same-saying to be accounted for; after all, both Feferman in (30) and Tarek in (31)
are saying that the person they are referring to is too old for graduate school. And
again, it is possible to truly report Feferman and Tarek as having said the same thing,
provided that we make it explicit that the reportee was referring to someone else:
(33) She is too old for graduate school. (Tarek, talking of Mitsuko)
(34) That's what Professor Feferman said, too, about Inma. (in reply to Tarek)
Let me take stock. In 2.4., we saw that in de se assertion, that is, in assertions that
a speaker makes about himself or herself, there is the intuition that different speakers
are saying the same thing. This is a problem for the dominant view, because, on the
10 In some cases, there may be a strict/sloppy ambiguity in the report, even if the addresse is
not specified. Here is one. On their first date, Tarek tells his girlfriend: "You are terrific." She
replies: "Every man says that on a first date." What she is likely to be saying is not that every
man says that she is terrific, but that they tell the person they are dating "You are terrific." In
this sort of case, the sloppy reading is probably available precisely because the strict reading is
pragmatically unavailable.
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assumption that the 1st person pronoun is indexical par excellence and contributes the
speaker to the semantic content,  we get it  that  de se  assertions made by different
speakers  inevitably have different  semantic  contents,  so that  the  semantic  content
cannot be the asserted content, it cannot be what is said. In response to this problem,
a defender of the dominant view could say that the reason why we have the intuition
that  the same thing has been said,  and why we can truly report  such speakers as
having  said  the  same  thing,  is  that  they have  used  the  same  words,  or  at  least,
sentences of the same lexical meaning. But this response will not work. First, as we
saw in 2.5., it is just as easy to have the same intuition of same-saying when speakers
making de se assertions are using different, non-synonymous sentences, and to truly
report  them as having said the same thing Second, if  using the same sentence,  or
uttering the same words, is supposed to account for certain cases in which we can
correctly report that the same thing has been said, namely cases from 2.4., then why is
it that in some other cases, such as those involving the 2nd and 3rd person pronouns,
discussed in the present section, the prediction turns out to be wrong? Until it gives
us a satisfactory answer to this question, the dominant, Kaplanian approach to what is
said  proves to be extremely limited.  
3 What Is Said: the Theory. 
Although the distinction between lexical meaning and what is said has been thought
to be ineliminable and fairly well defined, the usefulness of this distinction has been
questioned in the past. There are those who will say that the notion of 'what is said' is
just hopelessly pragmatic, and that semantics has little to do with it. In section 3.1., I
will briefly look at some evidence that could possibly be interpreted as showing the
intuitive notion of what is said to be just too volatile to be captured by the notion of
semantic content. I will very briefly talk of two responses to this sort of case. The
literalist response is that semantic content is what is said, but our intuitions are not a
liable guide to this arguably semantic notion. Though the literalist response might be
on the right track with respect to the cases coming up in 3.1., I will, as promised, offer
some reasons  to  think that  it  is  not  the  right  response  to  the  cases  discussed  in
sections  2.3.–2.6.  The  second  response,  which  may also  be  said  "literalist"  with
respect to semantic content, while very much "contextualist" with respect to what is
said, is the one that gives up the hope of accounting for what is said within semantics.
Some of the reasons offered against the straightforward literalist response will also
work against this other response. But more importantly, if we can provide a semantic
theory of what is said that accounts for all the problematic cases discussed here, then
there will be little left that is compelling in that negative, skeptical attitude according
to which the notion of what is  said is just too hopelessly pragmatic to be of any
concern to semantics. An outline of such a semantic theory is what I shall seek to
provide in sections 3.2. and 3.3.
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3.1. A Hopeless Enterprise?
Some philosophers, already early on, were doubtful that the notion of what is said
was robust  and  clear  enough to  be  captured  within a  theory of semantic  content.
David  Lewis  thus  famously  wrote:  “Unless  we  give  it  some  special  technical
meaning,  the  locution  ‘what  is  said’  is  very far  from  univocal. It  can  mean  the
propositional content, in Stalnaker's sense (horizontal or diagonal). It can mean the
exact words. I suspect that it can mean almost anything in between” (1980: 97).11 Paul
Ziff put forward other examples that similarly show how versatile the notion of what
is said can be. Here is an example inspired by one of Ziff's. Suppose that Inma and
Tarek went to a certain party, to which Mitsuko could not go. Mitsuko now wants to
know how the party went. She asks Inma, who says:
(35) Oh, I shouldn't have gone. 'Twas better to stay home and do some needle-work.
Later, Mitsuko asks Tarek, and he tells her:
(36) My goodness! I don't think I've ever been more bored in my whole life.
Mitsuko might well reply:
(37) Yes, Inma said that, too.
Or, talking yet to someone else about the party, Mitsuko might report:
(38) Both Inma and Tarek told me that the party was really boring.
Although the intuitions are not very robust in the case of (37) and (38), it is still true
that in everyday life, we often report people as having said the same thing when all
that their utterances have in common is a certain implication, and that implication is
relevant in the context of the report. Thus, while Inma does not literally say in (35)
that the party was really boring, what she does say, viz. that instead of going, she
should have stayed home to do some needle-work, implies, given enough contextual
background (such as the assumption that needle-work is not a particularly exciting
activity), that the party was really boring. And similarly for (36).
Is this "implication sense" of what is said, as Ziff calls it, an insuperable obstacle
to a semantic approach to what is said? Not for the defenders of the dominant view
who will adopt the literalist response, like K. Bach or J. Saul.12 For, they will say that
Mitsuko's reply in (37) is literally false, though it may convey something true. They
will also say that the report in (38) is, likewise, literally false, though it is true that,
loosely speaking, Inma and Tarek said the same thing, because one could infer that
the party was boring from what they said strictly speaking. 
11 Stalnaker's horizontal propositional content is, roughly, the same as Kaplan's content, while
the diagonal content comes closer to Kaplan's character.  
12 See e.g. Bach (2002), Saul (2002).
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For once, the literalist view could be on the right track. For, even if we have the
intuition that  the reports (37)  and (38)  are not exactly false,  and that  they would
normally communicate something true, we also have the intuition that (35) and (36)
do not exactly say the same thing. This intuition, too, is reflected in the way we report
what others have said:
(39) The party was very boring. (said by Tarek)
(40) Inma said that, too. (Mitsuko, on the basis of Inma's utterance of (35))
(41) That's not quite true. Inma only said that she shouldn't have gone, and that it was
better for her to have stayed home to do some needle-work. (reply to Mitsuko)
Intuitively, the reply in (41) is true. This, in turn, suggests that when we judged (37)
to be true, and when we, at a first glance, judged (40) to be true, too, our judgments
of truth were not very robust. Indeed, once we ask ourselves what it is  exactly  that
Inma said, and once we realize that Inma was maybe trying to finish a piece that she
had been knitting,  and that  that's  maybe why she thought she should have stayed
home,  and if  so,  that  the  party maybe wasn't  even boring for  Inma,  then we are
actually willing to retract from our earlier judgment that the report was true, and to
re-evaluate it as false. According to the literalist, the report had been false all the way
long, and the instability of our judgments, they might say, precisely shows that our
intuitions on what is said cannot be trusted.13
Somewhat ironically, the plausibility of the literalist response in this sort of case is
precisely what shows it to be a bad response in the sort of cases previously discussed.
For, there is a striking difference between the implication sense of what is said and
the sense in which, say, different speakers making same de se assertions say the same
thing. Consider:
(42) I am writing a book on Montague. (said by Prof. Feferman)
(43) I am writing a book on Montague. (said by Inma)
13 For the literalist, the reports in (37), (38) and (40) are inevitably false. But my own position,
even though I said that in this type of cases, the literalist response could well be on the right
track, is more complex. I do not hold that the report in (37) is necessarily false. It might well
be true. What "retraction" shows is merely that a report that was true in one context may well
turn out false in another context (even if the reported utterances are the same). What accounts
for this change of truth value is that the standards for what counts as same-saying are different.
In the context of (37), the standards were "low": having one and the same relevant implication
in common was thus enough to make the report true. In the context of (41), where the exact
wording has been raised to salience and the standards were shifted to high, the report in (37),
as well as the report in (40), are seen as false. This is the same phenomenon that we find with
knowledge attributions,  which has recently received considerable  attention and has elicited
debates among invariantism, contextualism and relativism. The phenomenon, however, is not
directly relevant to the main issues of my paper, and for my purposes,  it  would work fine
enough if we interpreted the data as the literalist does, and if we saw the reports in (37), (38)
and (40) as downright false. 
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(44) Prof. Feferman said that, too. (Tarek's reply to Inma, on the basis of Feferman's
utterance of (42))
(45) (?) That's not quite true. He only said that he was writing a book on Montague.
(Mitsuko's reply to Tarek)
While we were inclined to judge that, in (41), the "that's not quite true" reply was
true, making in turn the report in (40) false, the case is very different with (45), where
we are inclined to judge Mitsuko's reply false. More precisely, if someone remarks to
us that Tarek's report in (44) is false, our reaction is that the person did not properly
disambiguate the report, and that they judge it false only because they got the wrong
reading.  The  same is  the  case  with incorrect  disambiguations  of  the  strict/sloppy
ambiguity of the more usual type, as with VP-ellipsis:
(46) Inma loves her boyfriend. 
(47) So does Mitsuko.
(48) (?) That's not quite true. Mitsuko only loves her own boyfriend. 
When presented with a reply as in (48) to the pair (46)-(47), we will, of course, say
that one who made such a reply did not resolve the ellipsis in (47) correctly. Exactly
the same explanation goes for Mitsuko's reply in (45). In none among the cases raised
in 2.3., 2.4. and 2.5. are we going to re-evaluate the report as being false, the way we
did in the case of the report  in (40). We will maintain that the report is true, and
discard any "that's not quite true" reply as arising from an incorrect disambiguation of
the report.
Let me end this section by mentioning another type of response, which seems to be
becoming more and more popular, although it goes back at least to Lewis (1980). It
consists in relegating the notion of what is said to pragmatics, and it viewing it as a
notion that has little or nothing to do with semantic content. 
It goes without saying that this type of response may be endorsed by authors who
need not share their views with respect to the notion of semantic content. Among
those who seek to banish what is said into the realm of pragmatics (whether they give
arguments for this position, or simply endorse it), we find E. Borg, H. Cappelen, E.
Lepore, D. Lewis, S. Predelli, N. Salmon, S. Soames. It is beyond the scope of this
paper to discuss their position(s) at length.14 It is enough to point out that they are
missing something crucial in its understanding of the notion of what is said. They are
missing the fact that, as we have just shown, there is a sharp difference between loose
uses of the locution 'what is said', in which utterances with same implicatures may be
truly reported as saying the same thing, and literal uses of the locution 'what is said',
which sometimes (as in 2.1., 2.2. and 2.6.) but not always (as in 2.3., 2.4. and 2.5.) fit
the conception of what is said as Kaplanian semantic content.
14 In my recent paper (2006), I provide a survey of the theoretical landscape and of the various
approaches to the notions of what is said and of semantic content. There, I discuss at greater
length the mainstream position, as well as its adversary, the contextualist position (cf. Recanati
(2003)), but also some alternatives, such as J. Perry's reflexive-referential theory, K. Bach's
theory of implicitures, and the minimalism of E. Borg and of H. Cappelen and E. Lepore. 
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3.2.  What Is Said, What Is Talked About, and Reported Speech 
What I want to do in the remainder of my paper is to present, albeit in very rough
lines, a theory which takes what is said to be lexical meaning, and identifies the latter
with semantic content, and that then show how this theory handles the data presented
in this paper. 
It will be helpful to start by laying down the main tenets of my proposal:
a) what is said by a given utterance is nothing more or less than
the lexical meaning of the sentence uttered;
b) the lexical meaning (of a sentence) is something that can be
true with respect to some things while being false with respect
to some other things;
c) when we make an assertion, we do not merely assert what the
sentence uttered means in virtue of its lexical meaning, but we
assert it of, or about, something;
d) the lexical meaning of indexicals has certain features
associated with presuppositions. In particular, operators such
as negation, modality, etc. do not apply to the conditions
encoded in the meaning of an indexical, even when the
indexical lies in the (syntactic) scope of the operator;15
e) when we report what is said by some utterance as being the
same (or different) as what is said by some other utterance,
we presuppose it known in the context of the report what the
reported utterances are respectively about.
Since it is meanings, not propositions, that are presupposed, and since meanings
are not true or false simpliciter, but of things (times, individual, situations), instead of
asking whether a given presupposition associated with an indexical is simply satisfied
in a given context, we must ask whether it is satisfied, in a given context, of a given
thing. But apart from this proviso, our proposal is neutral on the question of how to
understand or formally account for the notion of presupposition. 
To get a better grip on it, it will help to see how this account works on a particular
example. Consider Inma who, holding up a hammer in her hand, says to Tarek:
(49) This is heavy.
In uttering (49), Inma is referring to the hammer: she is drawing Tarek's attention
to it, so that he may identify the hammer as that of which she wants to say something.
Since the hammer at stake also satisfies the conditions in the lexical meaning of 'this',
viz. being something salient and proximal, Inma will manage to say something about
that very hammer, namely, that it is heavy.16 But the hammer itself is not part of the
semantic content of (49), nor is it part of what Inma said. 
15 For a detailed exposition and defense of the semantic account of indexicals in line with tenet
d), see my monograph (2006).
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Now, the lexical meaning of the whole sentence is something that will be true with
respect to some things at some times and false with respect to the same or different
things at the same or some other time. For example, it is true of the hammer in Inma's
hand and of the situation in which she is uttering (49),  but it is false of the same
hammer relative to the situation in which Sonia utters (49) while holding up a feather
in her hand (because the hammer is no longer salient, it is no longer "a this"), and it is
again obviously false of the feather itself.
Let us briefly see what tenet e) amounts to. Reconsider Inma's utterance, made in
reference to the hammer, followed by a reply from Tarek:
(50) This is heavy.
(51) That's what Mitsuko said, too.
When Tarek reports Mitsuko as having said what Inma has just said, the issue of
what it was that Mitsuko was talking about will be taken for granted in the context of
the report. Given that Tarek does not explicitly mention anything as being the thing
of which Mitsuko said that it was heavy, it will be understood that Mitsuko said it of
the same thing as Inma did, namely, of that same hammer. This is why the report will
come out intuitively false when Tarek makes it on the grounds of Mitsuko's uttering
the same sentence as Inma did, while referring to something other than the hammer,
say, to her suitcase. But the presupposition that Mitsuko was talking of the same thing
as Inma can, of course, be explicitly canceled. That is what we saw in section 2.6.:
(52) This is heavy. (Inma, talking of the hammer)
(53) That's what Mitsuko said, too, of her suitcase. (Tarek's reply to Inma)
And if Mitsuko did say that her suitcase was heavy, Tarek's reply is, of course, true.  
3.3. How It Works
I have presented a proposal that identifies what is said by a given utterance with the
lexical meaning of the sentence uttered.  Let me now quickly review the key cases
from sections 2.1. to 2.6., and show how my account handles them.
1.  Different meanings, same things said. The contribution of time.
One major challenge to my proposal is that we often intuitively say the same thing
using sentences that, lexically, do not mean the same thing: 
(54) I have graduated in math. (said by Inma) 
(55) She has graduated in math. (said by Tarek pointing at Inma)
16 I discuss at length this "procedural" role of linguistic meaning in utterance interpretation and
in particular in reference resolution in my monograph on indexicals (2005). 
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How are we going to capture the intuition that, in some important sense, what is
said by those utterances is the same, if the meaning of (54) is that the  speaker  has
graduated in math, while the meaning of (55) is that some contextually salient female
has. If lexical meaning = what is said, isn't that a straightforward denial that Inma and
Tarek have said the same thing? 
Our proposal denies indeed that (54) and (55) say the same thing tout court. But
that does not mean that there is no sense in which Inma and Tarek may be understood
and correctly reported as having said the same thing. We account for this in three
steps. First, if we analyze the sentences uttered in (54) and (55), we will see that they
contain the same verb phrase, with the same lexical meaning, viz. 'has graduated in
math'. The sentences uttered do, then, overlap in their lexical meaning (hence in what
is said) to the extent that they predicate the same thing. Second, we ought to explain
how the parts that have different lexical meanings may be ignored in judging whether
the same thing has been said. The parts that are ignored correspond to the words 'I'
and 'she'. As noted earlier, and elsewhere in the literature, the conditions lexically
associated with indexicals have the features of presuppositions. The fact that a given
thing satisfies such a condition, like the fact that Inma is the speaker of (54), or the
fact that Inma is the most salient female in the context of (55), are not the sort of facts
that we normally assert or communicate, nor do we need to inform other people of
such facts. Rather, the speaker will assume that such facts are already known to her
audience, and will exploit this knowledge to help them figure out about whom she is
talking. Given that those parts of the lexical meaning of a sentence that correspond to
indexicals are only asserted for heuristic purposes, it comes as no surprise that they
should often be ignored in assessing or reporting what is said. Finally, the third step
in our account of why (54) and (55) are so easily heard as saying the same thing lies
in the fact that the person that Inma is talking about is the same as the person that
Tarek is talking about: it is Inma herself. Both Inma and Tarek are talking about the
same person (Inma), and are asserting about her the same thing, namely, that she has
graduated in math. 
True enough, our account also predicts that there is a sense in which Inma and
Tarek are not saying the same thing. If you wish, Inma is, after all, saying of herself
that she is a speaker (an "I"), while Tarek is saying of her that she is a contextually
salient female (a "she"). But, as already pointed out, this difference in what is said is
not significant, because Inma is saying of herself that she is a speaker only so that her
audience may figure out that she is talking about herself (as opposed to, say, Tarek).
It is easy to see that the above account of the basic case from 2.1. – a case that had
served to motivate the dominant view – applies straightforwardly to the first case
from 2.3. – a case that serves to cast doubt on the dominant view –, a variant of which
is repeated below:
(56) I have graduated in math. (Inma, on Friday, March 31, 2006)
(57) Inma has graduated in math. (Tarek, talking of Inma, on Tuesday, April 3, 2006).
(58) She said that, too. (a possible reply to Tarek's utterance of (57))
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Although time is relevant to the truth of (56) and (57), and although it is possible
that their truth values diverge (for instance, if Inma graduated only on Monday April
2, (57) is true but (56) is false), it has been noted that, intuitively, (56) and (57) say
the same thing, and that the report in (58) is true. The account that I gave of the same-
saying in (54) and (55) can be repeated, to the letter, in the case of (56) and (57). The
only thing that is worth adding is that since (56) and (57) are not directly about time,
nor are they about events whose time is  a subject matter of the conversation, the
report in (58) does not come with the presupposition that when Inma said what Tarek
said, she was talking of the same time; for, neither Tarek nor Inma were really talking
about time. That is what, I think, accounts for the difference with the "dinner" case:
(59) Inma is having dinner. (said by Tarek, on March 31, at 7 pm)
(60) I am having dinner. (said by Inma, on March 31, at 11 pm)
(61) Tarek said that, too. (a possible reply to Inma's utterance of (60))
Putting aside the ambiguity in (61), and the reading on which Tarek said that he
was having dinner, we are more inclined to judge the report in (61) to be false than
we are to judge it to be true. The report will be readily evaluated as true, though, if
one explicitly mentions the time:
(62) That's what Tarek said, too, earlier this evening/at 7 pm. (possible replies to (60))
The explanation that I am suggesting of why we are inclined to say that the report
in (61) is false is that, since having dinner is an event the time of which seems to be
relevant in the context of an utterance such as (60), the report that someone else said
the same thing comes with the presupposition that the other person was talking of the
same time. That is, remember, the gist of tenet e) of our theory. Now, given that
Tarek did not say about late evening time, elevenish pm, that Inma was having dinner
then, we take the report to be false. But so, the falsity of the report would be due to a
presupposition that could not be "accommodated", to use linguists' jargon, rather than
to a difference in what was actually said. This is further supported by the fact that the
presupposition may be explicitly canceled, as in (62).    
2.  De Se Assertions
A major challenge to my proposal is to account for the fact that often, even though
the same sentence has been uttered, there is the intuition that different things have
been said, while reporting that the same thing has been said seems incorrect. Let me
start with the case from 2.2. – originally Kaplan's example, which he took to motivate
his view. Consider:
(63) I was insulted yesterday. (said by Kaplan, on Friday, March 31, 2006) 
(64) I was insulted yesterday. (said by X on Saturday, April 1st, 2006)
(65) Kaplan said that, too. (a possible reply to X)
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Because (63) may be true while (64) is false and vice versa, Kaplan concludes that
what is said must be different: what is said in (63) is about Kaplan and about what
happened on March 31, while what is said in (63) is about X and about the following
day. In my account, what is said in (63) and in (64) is the same thing: it is the lexical
meaning of the sentence "I was insulted yesterday" – roughly, that the speaker was
insulted on the day before the day of utterance. However, this meaning is not true or
false simpliciter, but it is true or false with respect to a person at a time. So (63) can
only bear a truth value after being given a person and a time to be evaluated at, and
that will presumably be the person and the time that the speaker of the utterance is
talking about and referring to. Kaplan is talking about himself on Friday, March 31,
while  X  is  talking  about  herself  on  Saturday.  The  difference  in  their  respective
subject matters accounts not only for a possible difference in truth values, but also for
the intuition that different things have been said. So, to repeat, I submit that what is
said in (63) and in (64) is the same, but because it is said of different individuals and
of different days, people may get the intuition that what is said is different.    
The difference in subject matter is what accounts for the fact that the report in (65)
may be false. Recall, that report is ambiguous between a strict and a sloppy reading,
but if we put the sloppy reading aside for the moment, the report is false (on the
assumption that Kaplan didn't say that X was insulted on April 1st). The reason why it
is false is that when we report that the same thing has been said, we typically take it
for granted that this was said about the same thing. If it was not, then we ought to
make it explicit that it was said about something or someone else. But if we leave that
implicit, then the report  will receive its truth value depending on whether the two
reportees indeed said the same thing about one and the same thing.
Let us now address the issue of the sloppy readings of reports of de se assertions,
that  is,  reports  of  utterances  made using the  1st person pronoun.  Let  me use  my
example from section 2.4., slightly simpler than Kaplan's, since it does not involve the
indexical 'yesterday':
(66) I am writing a book on Montague. (said by Prof. Feferman)
(67) I am writing a book on Montague. (said by Inma)
(68) Prof. Feferman said that, too. (Tarek's reply to Inma, on the basis of Feferman's
utterance of (66))
As noted, (68) is ambiguous. Suppose that it is common knowledge between Inma
and Tarek that Prof. Feferman does not know of Inma, hence that he could not have
been saying anything specifically about Inma. Then (68) will be naturally understood
as reporting Feferman as having said that he was writing a book on Montague. Tenet
e) of our theory predicts that when we report what is said by Inma in (67) as being the
same as what Prof. Feferman had said, we presuppose it known in the context what
Feferman's  reported  utterance  was  about.  The  presupposition  that  Feferman's
utterance was about the same person as Inma's, namely, about Inma, is pragmatically
canceled, since it is common knowledge that Feferman could not have been talking
about Inma, of whom he had never even heard. Given that his utterance was not about
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Inma, the next most plausible hypothesis was is that his utterance must have been
about himself. 
More generally, the data on de se  assertions and our practices of reporting them
(but  also  our  practices  of  reporting  de  se  beliefs,  for  that  matter)  suggests  the
following interpretation rule:
f) when, with respect to a given de se assertion u1, we report
what is said by some other utterance u2 as being the same as
what is said by u1, either u2 is about the same person as u1, or
it is a de se assertion, hence about the utterer of u2.
The generalization in f), together with tenet e), makes it possible to account for the
same-saying of  de se  assertions with sentences whose lexical meanings are not the
same, as in section 2.5. Consider:
(69) I really like Feferman's class on Montague. (said by Inma)
(70) I really like this class. (said by Mitsuko about Feferman's class on Montague)
(71) Inma said that, too. (Tarek's reply to Mitsuko, on the basis of (69))
In (70), we have two subject matters: Mitsuko, and the class she says she likes,
namely F.'s class on Montague. But (70) is also a  de se assertion, as it is about the
speaker herself, namely Mitsuko. The report in (71) is, of course, ambiguous, but if
we put aside the strict reading (for which we account in the same way as we did for
the basic case from section 2.1.), the sloppy reading is accounted for by rule f): the
utterance made by Inma and reported as saying the same thing as Mitsuko's was also
a de se assertion. Moreover, the two de se assertions assert the same thing, namely,
that there is a class that the agent really likes. Tenet e) further tells us that the report
in (71) presupposes that the two assertions, though about different "selves", should
otherwise  be  about  the  same  subject  matter,  hence  about  the  same  class,  viz.
Feferman's class on Montague.
Finally, for reasons of space, I shall abstain from spelling out the account of the
cases from section 2.6. But the account of the previous cases already contains all the
elements required to deal with those from 2.6., hence it should be an easy exercise for
the reader to run those cases through the machinery that I have put forward.
4 Conclusion
One of the central  tenets of the dominant view is the distinction between lexical
meaning and what is said. We first saw two types of cases that prima facie motivate
this  distinction  –  the  "different  meanings,  same thing said"  cases  and  the  "same
meanings, different things said" cases, as I called them. But then, I presented a series
of cases that fit very badly into the dominant view. For, we often get the intuition that
the same thing has been said, even though the reported utterances do not have the
same Kaplanian content, nor do the sentences uttered have the same lexical meaning.
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We have also seen that in certain cases, namely, in  de se  assertions, utterances of
sentences that lexically mean the same thing are easily reported as saying the same
thing, even when their Kaplan contents are different, yet in some other cases, namely,
in de te and de re assertions, such reports only work either if the assertions are about
the same thing (hence their Kaplanian contents will be the same), or if the reporter
makes it explicit that the reportees were talking about different things. In the last part
of the paper I put forward, albeit in rough lines, my own account of what is said, on
which it is nothing less or more than the lexical meaning of the sentence uttered. The
two key notions for my account are lexical meanings (which, in turn,  are  semantic
contents) and what is talked about, or the subject matter of the utterance. We also saw
that certain semantic and perhaps syntactic properties of speech reports and indirect
discourse need to be taken into account in order to explain some of our intuitions on
what is said,  which admittedly to not always support the equation "what is said =
lexical meaning." Finally, I tried to illustrate how my account works by applying it,
case by case, both to those examples that seem to motivate the dominant view and to
those cases that seem to undermine it.17  
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